UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-3-2013

Cuevas v. Barraza Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40516

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Cuevas v. Barraza Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40516" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 871.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/871

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,
Plaintiff-CounterdefendantRespondent,

Supreme Court No. 40516
(Canyon #2009-8175)

vs.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any),
Defendant-CounterclaimantAppellant,
and
LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual and
spouse (if any); DOES I THROUGH X,
UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS TO THE REAL
PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN EXHIBIT "A'', :
COMMONLY KNOWN AS 29452 PEARL '
ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,
Defendants.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

HONORABLE MOLLY J. HUSKEY, DISTRICT JUDGE

ROBERT WARD
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
340 EAST 2ND NORTH
MOUNTAIN HOME, IDAHO 83647
TEL: (208) 587-4412
FAX: (208) 587-3144
ISB No. 4442

REBECCA A. RAINEY, PA
910 W. MAIN STREET, SUITE 258
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
TEL: (208) 559-6434
FAX: (208) 473-2952
ISB No. 7525

Attorneys for Appellant/Defendant

Attorney for Respondent/Plaintiff

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................ ii
I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................... l
1.

Nature of the Case ........................................................................... 1

2.

Procedural Background ..................................................................... 1

3.

Facts ........................................................................................... 2

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL ............................................................................... 3

III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. ................................................................ .4

IV.

ARGUI\1ENT .......................................................................................... 4

V.

1.

Bernardino Barraza has a vendee's lien against the real property.......................... .4

2.

The statute of limitations does not bar Bernardino Barraza from enforcing the
vendee's lien ................................................................................................. 5

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 8

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases
Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 343 (2012) ........................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8
Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 268 P.3d 1167, 1177 (2012) ............................... .4
Blankenship v. Myers, 97 Idaho 356, 370-71, 544 P.2d 314, 328-29 (1975) .......................... 6
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517, 198 P.3d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2008) ...................... 7, 8
Statutes
I.C. §§ 5-216 ................................................................................................... 6
I.C. §§ 5-217 ................................................................................................... 6
I.C. §§ 12-120 ................................................................................................... 4
I.C. §§ 12-121 .................................................................................................. 4

Rules
I.R.C.P. 15(c) ................................................................................................... 8
I.A.R. 41 ......................................................................................................... 4

11

I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This case is about the ownership of a certain parcel of real property. Plaintiffs
predecessor in interest, Juan Cuevas, originally sold the real property to Defendant, Bernardino
Barraza, and a quiet title action between Juan Cuevas and Bernardino Barraza later ensued. In
that quiet title action, Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, received a quiet title judgment in his favor
and against Plaintiffs predecessor in interest, Juan Cuevas. Juan Cuevas did not appeal the quiet
title judgment nor did he file a motion requesting it to be set aside. Juan Cuevas quitclaim
deeded the real property to his relative, Wilfrido Cuevas, who filed a new quiet title action
against, Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. The district court granted Wilfrido Cuevas' Motion for
Summary Judgment and held that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, prior quiet title judgment
was void and that Bernardino Barraza did not have any interest in the real property. The
Supreme Court overturned the granting of plaintiff, Wilfrido Cueva's Motion for Summary
Judgment by the district judge, finding that there was sufficient evidence to support a claim by
Bernardino Barraza for a vendee' s lien against the real property. See Cuevas v. Barraza, l 52
Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 343 (2012). The district court on remand granted summary judgment
to Wilfrido Cuevas holding that Bernardino Barraza does not have a vendee's lien. Bernardino
Barraza appealed the district court's decision.

B.

Procedural Background

This case was on remand from the Supreme Court ofldaho who overturned the granting
of the Wilfrido Cuevas' Motion for Summary Judgment by the district judge, finding that there
was sufficient evidence to support a claim by Bernardino Barraza for a vendee's lien against the
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real property. See Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 343 (2012).
Upon remand the district court decided the entire case upon cross motions for summary
judgment and held that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza does not have a vendee' s lien.
C.

Facts

All facts referred to in this memorandum are found in the Facts and Procedural section of

Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337 (2012). Those facts are as follows:
Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Juan")
jointly held title to real property commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road, Parma,
Idaho, pursuant to a warranty deed recorded in Canyon County on June 15, 1993.
In March 2001, Juan allegedly executed a written contract to sell the property to
Bernardino Barraza and Liobaldo Garza (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Barraza") for a total purchase price of $80,000. 1
Barraza claims he paid a total of $22,635 toward the purchase, but then the
agreement fell apart. He asserts Juan agreed to repay him $20,000 upon resale of
the property ifhe would vacate the premises, which he did. Barraza claims Juan
never repaid any money. In response, on May 6, 2002, Barraza recorded a claim
oflien against the property, purportedly securing an "unpaid refund in the amount
$20,000.00 for the payments on Real Estate Title."2
Wilfrido Cuevas claims he began purchasing the property under an oral
agreement with Juan in August of 2003. At that time he moved onto the property
with his family, began making improvements to it, started paying the property
taxes on it, and began making payments to Juan pursuant to the oral agreement.
On April 2, 2007, Juan filed a quiet title action against Barraza, seeking to clear
his title of Barraza's purported lien. Barraza failed to respond and the district
court entered a default judgment against him on May 15, 2007, which was
recorded May 17, 2007. On May 24, 2007, Barraza moved to set aside the default
judgment, attaching his proposed Answer and Counterclaim-which included an
affirmative request for the court to quiet title in his name-to his attorney's
affidavit in support of that motion.
Around June 13, 2007, Wilfrido claims he paid the remaining balance of the
purchase price to Juan pursuant to their oral contract, based on his understanding
that Juan had successfully quieted title. Juan executed a quitclaim deed
transferring his interest to Wilfrido, and Wilfrido claims he researched the
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Canyon County land records to ensure title was clear before recording it on June
20, 2007. 3
On June 25, 2007, the district court denied Barraza's motion to set aside the
default judgment, and Barraza appealed. On June 25, 2008, the Court of Appeals
issued an opinion vacating the default judgment and remanding the case. Cuevas
v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 198 P.3d 740 (Ct.App.2008). The Court of Appeals
held that (1) Barraza's poor English and mistaken belief that he was being
represented by counsel constituted mistake or excusable neglect sufficient to set
aside the judgment, and (2) the proposed Answer and Counterclaim served with
Barraza's motion presented a meritorious breach of contract defense to the quiet
title action. Id.
Following issuance of the Court of Appeals opinion, Barraza recorded a !is
pendens against the property on August 6, 2008. On January 6, 2009, the Court of
Appeals entered the Remittitur, and on January 15, 2009, the district court granted
Juan's attorney leave to withdraw. Although a copy of the order granting leave to
withdraw was mailed to Juan on January 23, 2009, Juan failed to appear. The
district court entered default judgment quieting title in Barraza on March 17,
2009, and Barraza recorded the quiet title judgment on March 24, 2009.
After learning that he no longer held title to the property, Wilfiido filed a new suit
against Barraza to quiet title on August 7, 2009, and Barraza answered. Wilfiido
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the default judgment entered against
Juan was void. The district court granted that motion, ruling from the bench that
(1) the judgment was void for lack of notice because the Answer and
Counterclaim was never properly filed or served on Juan and, (2) alternatively,
Wilfiido could collaterally attack the judgment notwithstanding the doctrine of
res judicata because he was not in privity with Juan.
Following limited discovery, Wilfiido again moved for summary judgment,
seeking to quiet title in the property and arguing that Barraza did not have a viable
unjust enrichment claim against Wilfiido. The district court also granted this
second motion, ruling from the bench that (1) Barraza failed to establish a valid
claim against the property, and (2) Barraza did not unjustly enrich Wilfiido. The
district court denied Barraza's motion to reconsider and entered judgment quieting
title in Wilfiido's name. Barraza timely appealed.
Id., 152 Idaho at 892-93, 277 P.3d at 339-40 (footnotes omitted).

II.
1.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Bernardino Barraza has a vendee's lien against the real property.
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2.

The statute of limitations does not bar Bernardino Barraza from enforcing the
vendee' s lien.
III.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The appellant, Mr. Barraza, requests attorney fees pursuant to I. C. §§ 12-120 and 12-121,
and I.A.R. 41.
IV.
1.

ARGUMENT

Bernardino Barraza has a vendee's lien on the real property and his vendee's

lien is fully enforceable against the plaintiff.

In 1887, the territorial legislature created statutory vendor's and vendee's liens,
which are now codified as Idaho Code sections 45-801 and 45-804 ....
Section 45-804 states,
One who pays to the owner any part of the price of real property, under an
agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the property, independent
of possession, for such part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover
back, in case of a failure of consideration.
In 1887, the territorial legislature also enacted what is now codified as Idaho Code
section 45-803, which states:
The liens of vendors and purchasers of real property are valid against every one
claiming under the debtor, except a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and
for value.

Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 268 P.3d 1167, 1177 (2012).
Bernardino Barraza clearly has a vendee's lien. Bernardino Barraza had an agreement
with Juan Cuevas to purchase the real property which is the subject of this litigation. Bernardino
Barraza paid to Juan Cuevas over $20,000.00 toward the purchase of the property and occupied
the real property. Juan Cuevas later approached Bernardino Barraza and requested him to vacate
the property and said that if Bernardino Barraza would vacate the property, Juan Cuevas would
refund to him the $20,000.00 down payment once the real property was sold to another
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purchaser. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 339 (2012). Bernardino Barraza
vacated the property and filed a lien to notify the world that he had an interest in the property "in
the amount of $20,000.00 for the payments on Real Estate Title." Id. Juan Cuevas filed a Quiet
Title Action on April 2, 2007, to remove the lien that Bernardino Barraza filed. Id. At no time
prior to the Quiet Title Action did Juan Cuevas deed the real property or record any transfer of
ownership to the property. Id. See also the affidavits of the parties on file with the court.
This clearly created a vendee's lien in favor of Bernardino Barraza on the real property.
The consideration of the agreement, the transfer of the real property to Bernardino Barraza by
Juan Cuevas, failed because Juan Cuevas failed to transfer the property or refund the $20,000.00
as promised. Bernardino Barraza could not technically collect the $20,000.00 from Juan Cuevas
until Juan Cuevas had re-sold the property as the parties agreed, but this did not lessen
Bernardino Barraza' s interest or claim in the real property.
Therefore, Bernardino Barraza was acting well within in his rights to notify the world by
recording his lien, but he could not enforce the lien until Juan Cuevas failed to refund the
$20,000.00 to Bernardino Barraza. Moreover, the vendee's lien is valid against the plaintiff
because he was not a purchaser in good faith, and the plaintiff was specifically held by the
Supreme Court of Idaho to have actual knowledge of Bernardino Barraza's lien/claim. See
Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 343 (2012).

For all of the reasons stated above, Bernardino Barraza had a vendee's lien on the real
property and the lien was valid against the plaintiff.

2.

The statute of limitations has not run on the vendee's lien because the statute

of limitations on Bernardino Barraza's underlying claim for failure of
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consideration/breach of contract by Juan Cuevas has not run.

The Supreme Court of Idaho established in Blankenship v. Myers, the rule for
determining the statute oflimitations on a vendor's lien, which would apply to the vendee's lien
that is established by the same statute. The Supreme Court stated:
The vendor's lien is a lien created by statute, LC.§ 45-801, to protect the
unsecured seller of real property by giving him rights in the property sold, subject
to the rights of a good faith purchaser for value as provided in LC. § 45-803,
when he has no other collateral to secure payment for the property. This statutory
lien codified the common law rule which established a vendor's lien under similar
circumstances. At common law the vendor's lien generally could be enforced
against the vendee as long as the vendor could still bring an action against the
buyer for the unpaid purchase price. See 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor & Purchaser, s
462, p. 588 ( 1975). An action for enforcement of a vendor's lien and an action for
the unpaid purchase price are so interrelated that it is reasonable to conclude that
the legislature intended that the statute oflimitations for the lien claim would run
only when the statute of limitations runs to bar the claim for the debt. We adopt
the following language of the Supreme Court of California in the case of Finnell
v. Finnell, 156 Cal. 589, 105 P. 740 (1909), in which the California court, which
construed a vendor's lien statute substantially identical to Idaho's, stated:
'The right of a vendor to enforce his lien continues, unless waived, so long as an
action can be commenced for the purchase money ... .' 105 P. at 744 .
.. . We conclude that as long as the claim is not barred, the lien is not barred.
Blankenship v. Myers, 97 Idaho 356, 370-71, 544 P.2d 314, 328-29 (1975). Therefore, following
the logic of the Supreme Court in Blankenship the statute oflimitations on the vendee's lien in
this matter is enforceable so long as the statute of limitations on Bernardino Barraza's claim for
the $20,000.00 has not run.
The statute oflimitations for a written contract in Idaho is five years. LC. § 5-216. The
statute oflimitations on an oral contract in Idaho is four years. LC.§ 5-217. Bernardino
Barraza's claim arises from a written contract with Juan Cuevas for the purchase of the real
property at issue in this litigation. The contract was subsequently modified by the parties when
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Juan Cuevas told Bernardino Barraza that ifhe vacated the real property, Juan Cuevas would
refund $20,000.00 to Bernardino Barraza when Juan Cuevas sold the property to another party.
The underlying contract was in writing, but the modification was oral. Because Bernardino
Barraza's claim was based upon a written contract, the statute oflimitations should be five years,
but even if a court determines that because the modification to the contract was oral, Bernardino
Barraza's claims are based upon an oral contract, the statute oflimitations to pursue Bernardino
Barraza's claim is four years.
Regardless of whether the statute oflimitations is four or five years, the statute of
limitations has not expired in either event. The statute oflimitations for a breach of contract does
not begin to run until the time of the breach. This issue was addressed very clearly in the
previous Cuevas v. Barraza by the Court of Appeals.
A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon breach for limitations
purposes. See Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 830, 11 P.3d 20, 26 (2000);
Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 180, 484 P.2d 728, 729 (1971). The five-year
statute oflimitation for Barraza to bring this breach of contract claim began to run
when Barraza became aware of the breach. The breach alleged in Barraza's
answer occurred when Cuevas filed the instant quiet title action-April 2, 2007.
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517, 198 P.3d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2008). "The instant quiet
title action" referred to by the Court of Appeals was the quiet title action that Juan Cuevas filed
against Bernardino Barraza rather than selling the property to a third party and paying
Bernardino Barraza the $20,000.00 that Juan Cuevas owed to Bernardino Barraza.
Therefore, the statute oflimitations did not begin to run until April 7, 2007. The plaintiff
in this action filed his quiet title action on August 7, 2009. Bernardino Barraza timely filed his
Answer and filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim on December 18, 2009. See Register of
Action. Therefore, without taking into consideration whether the time that the first Cuevas v.
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Barraza was up on appeal, and the time that Bernardino Barraza was the owner of title of the real
property, tolled the statute of limitations, Bernardino Barraza preserved his claim by timely filing
his Amended Answer and Counterclaim.
The plaintiff may argue that Bernardino Barraza did not allege in his Amended Answer
and Counterclaim that he had a vendee's lien. However, this is irrelevant because Bernardino
Barraza did set forth in his Amended Answer and Counterclaim all of the conduct, transactions,
or occurrences that comprise the claim of a vendee's lien. Indeed, it was from these very
allegations that Bernardino Barraza set forth and the Supreme Court held that there was
sufficient evidence of a vendee' s lien to survive summary judgment. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152
Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 343 (2012). Indeed, that is why this case was remanded. Because the
Supreme Court ofldaho set aside Bernardino Barraza's quiet title judgment as owner of the
property, and held that he has a vendee's lien instead, Bernardino Barraza may, if necessary,
amend his pleadings by leave of the court to include his claim for the vendee's lien and to
foreclose on the vendee's lien, and those claims would relate back to the date of Bernardino
Barraza's Answer and Counterclaim for purposes of the statute oflimitations. Rule 15(c) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original pleading.
Therefore, the statute oflimitations has not run because Bernardino Barraza filed his claim with
the court well within the four or five year statute oflimitations.

V.

CONCLUSION

The court erred in disposing of all of Defendant's interest in the property and granting
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Plaintiff summary judgment. For all of the reasons stated above, Bernardino Barraza has a
vendee's lien against the real property at issue in this case. The lien is not barred by the statute
oflimitations, and this Court should deny the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and
grant Bernardino Barraza's Motion for Summary Judgment and find as a matter oflaw that
Bernardino Barraza has a $20,000.00 lien against the real property and that the plaintiff should
pay to Bernardino Barraza the $20,000.00 or grant the sale of the real property by the sheriff to
satisfy the lien.
DATED this

3r:;t day of May, 2013.

Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the
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